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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint i ff/Respondent. 
vs. 
J. D. COLLIER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No, 20653 
STATETviENr OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1* The Defendant was prejudiced by the State's witnesses 
violating the trial court order that witnesses be excluded from 
the courtroom and that they not talk among themselves. 
2. The State improperly suppressed exculpatory evidence. 
This evidence includes physical evidence, expended shell casings, 
and evidence as to findings of blood and urine samples taken from 
the Defendant Immediately after his arrest. 
3. The Defendant's Constitutional Rights were violated to 
an extent warranting reversal, by the trial court's refusal to 
allow Defendant to confront and cross-examine confidential 
informan ts. 
4. The State failed to prove the intent necessary to 
convict the Defendant of attempted murder. 
5. Evidence was improperly admitted in the State's case in 
chief concerning Defendant's prior criminal record, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the verdict of guilty rendered by the 
Honorable Ronald Ot Hyde, sitting with a jury, on July 22, 1981. 
The Defendant was found guilty on two counts of attempted 
criminal homicide, attempted murdei in the first degree. The 
Defendant waived his time for sentencing antl was sentenced on 
each count to a term in the Utah State Prison not less than five 
years and maybe for life, plus one year for the use of firearm to 
run consecutively. The sentences on the two counts of attempted 
murder were ordered to run concurrently. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 8th day of May, 1981, the Defendani, J.D. Collier, 
was arraigned in Circuit Court on two charges of attempted 
criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, in violation of 
Section 7G-5-202(e), Utah Code Annotated, 1958 (as amende^), The 
Defendant was bound over at a prel lint nary hearing held on May 18, 
1981, and Defendant entered a not guilty plea on May 22, 1981, in 
the District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, The Defendant 
appeared for a jury trial before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde on 
July 20, 21 and 22, 1981. Defendant- was represented by Maurice 
Richards of the Public Defender Association. 
Prior to the commencement of the trial on July 20, 1981, a 
conference was held in Judge Hyde's Chambers at v/hich time the 
following items were discussed. 
The Prosecutor for the State of Utah stated that he intended 
to present evidence concerning two felony warrants that were 
outstanding on the Defendani as of May 7, 19P1, evidence that he 
was an escapee from the Utah State Prison on that date, and 
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evidence that there was another outstanding warrant out of North 
Ogden on the same date* (R.IIO) Defendant's counsel strenuously 
objected to admitting any of this evidence, in that it would 
constitute a violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights 
under the Fifth Amendment, Defendant's -counsel further stated 
that the Defendant did not intend to testify, however, if the 
State Introduced this evidence the Defendant would be forced to 
testify to explain the circumstances surrounding his felony 
status. (R*112 and 113) Counsel for Defendant also objected to 
the admittance of the above described evidence on the basis that 
it was improper under the then existing Utah Rules of Evidence in 
that it impeaches the Defendant's character before he brings his 
character into Issue. (R,111 and 339-344) The Court overruled 
the Defendant's objections and allowed the evidence to be 
presented to the jury. (R,117, 159, 354 and 374) 
The Prosecutor also in Chambers, represented to the Court 
that he Intended to introduce testimony into trial which 
concerned a conversation wherein one or more confidential 
Informants had told various police officers that the Defendant 
was in town, that he was using drugs, that he was dangerous and 
that the Defendant had said that he would not be taken alive. 
The State intended to introduce this evidence solely through the 
testimony of the police officers to whom the confidential 
informants had spoken and did not intend to either divulge the 
names of these informants, or call them to the stand. 
Defendant's counsel objected to the entry of any of this 
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testimony into evidence on the grounds that U was hearsay, not 
within any of the exceptions of the hearsay rule, and 
furthermore, that it was violating the Defendant's rights under 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
which gives the Defendant a right to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him. (R. 118-121 and 124) The Court again 
overruled the Defendant's objections, and allowed this evidence 
to be presented to the jury, (R. 121, 180-107, 274 and 275} At 
this time, defense counsel moved the Court to exclude all 
witnesses from the courtroom and asked the Judge to instruct them 
not to discuss their testimonies between themselves, (R.'2o and 
130) 
The jury was brought into the courtroom and the evidence was 
presented to the jury as follows: On the afternoon of May 7, 
1881, police officers, acting in response to information received 
from confidential informants, surrounded a mobile home located at 
3860 Midland Drive, Roy, Utah. (R,256) Confidential informants 
had allegedly told the officers that the Defendant was located in 
this home, that he was using drugs, and that he was armed and 
dangerous, (R,180-107, 274 and 275) A number of police officers 
commenced a stake out of this house, (R,25G) Most of these 
officers were in unmarked vehicles and dressed in civilian 
clothing rather than in uniforms. (R.257, 253, 288, 292, 378 and 
597) The Defendant testified that during this period he was 
using painkilling medication to treat the painful symptoms of 
some rotten teeth and he was counteracting the drowsiness that 
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these painkillers caused by using speed. (R.592) He testified 
that due to the combination of the drugs which he was taking, he 
was in a wide awake drunken state, (R.594) 
At some point, the Defendant and another individual left the 
house. They were pursued by two or three police officers, none 
of than in uniform and all of whom were carrying shot guns. 
(R.259 and 595) One of these officers, an Officer Turner, 
followed the Defendant, an individual by the name of Hansen and 
one other individual, for a short distance. He then, without 
identifying himself as a police officer, told Hansen to stop. 
(R.285 and 596) Hansen immediately dropped to the ground and the 
Defendant took off running, thinking he was being set up for a 
robbery* (R.286) The Defendant ran across the field and, at some 
point in time, shots were fired in the Defendant's direction. 
There is a discrepancy in the testimony concerning when these 
initial shots were fired, however* they were fired either while 
the Defendant was in the field or shortly after he ran into a 
parked Mountain Bell Telephone van* (R.598, 265, 889 and 692) 
The Defendant entered the telephone van that was parked on the 
side of the road. Either before he got into the van or shortly 
thereafter, the tires of van were shot out by Officer Watts who 
was shooting a shotgun loaded with double 00 buckshot. (R.187, 
206 and 598) At some point during the scenario, the Defendant 
was wounded in the head by two (2) shots from one of the 
officer's guns* The evidence is not clear as to exactly when the 
Defendant was hit. (R.269, 407, 482 and 525) However, the 
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Defendant testified that he was hit shortly upon arriving at the 
van. (R.6G2) Within minutes after the van's tires were shot, 
three canisters of tear gas were exploded into the van. (R.266, 
350 and 602) At this point, both uniformed and plain clothed 
officers began approaching the van, however, the Defendant 
testified that he, at no time, saw any uniformed officers near 
the van. There is conflicting testimony as to conversations 
between the officers and the Defendant while he was sitting in 
the van. Officers1 Watts and Lui testified that the Defendant 
recognized the individuals as police officers and called them 
pigs. Officer Call, in his police report, made no mention of the 
word pig, but testified later, that he remembered that the 
Defendant had said the word "pig". (R.6S2) The Defendant 
himself testified that he did not recognized the individuals as 
police officers until after he began driving the vehicle. There 
is further testimony that while the officers were chasing the 
Defendant through the field and while they were surrounding the 
van, the Defendant had ample opportunity to shoot the officers 
but that at no time did he take any shots. (R.34S, 476 and 613) 
At some point, the Defendant then started the van and, with some 
effort, began driving down the road in the van, which at that 
point had three flat tires. As the Defendant proceeded down the 
road toward a police road block, there were a number of shots 
fired at the Defendant by several police officers. (R.506 and 
327) At this time, the Defendant shot several rounds in the 
vicinity of a couple of the officers. Officer Call testified 
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that one of these shots actually hit him in the elbow. This 
wound was a very superficial wound, requiring no treatment. 
(R466, 557 and 300) Officer Hammond then shot two rounds of 
double 00 buckshot through the front windshield of the van. 
(R.508) As the van abruptly came to a halt, the officers jumped 
In and pulled the Defendant out, knocked him to the concrete and 
discovered that the Defendant had a head wound and was semi-
conscious. (R.268, 337, 405 and 226} The Defendant was 
arrested, taken to the hospital for treatment of his wounds and 
was subsequently charged with the offenses of attempted criminal 
homicide* 
During the course of the trial, Officer Hammond testified 
that a blood test was taken of the Defendant and that no traces 
of drugs or alcohol were found in the Defendant?s blood system, 
and further, that there was a written report regarding the test. 
(R.536) Officer Hammond was then recalled during Defendant's 
case and he admitted that he had mis-stated himself earlier and 
that there was actually no written report that determined any 
substances in the Defendant's system of drugs or alcohol. 
(R.686) 
During the Prosecutor's direct examination of Officer Lui, 
the witness exclusion rule was in effect. Officer Lu i ' s 
testimony suggested that he and Officer Watts had discussed 
Watt's prior testimony. While Officer Lui was a witness on the 
stand, he was asked: 
Q. Could you hear that response? 
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A. Yes. 
0. Was it directly responsive to the statement that you had 
made ''Throw your gun down and come on out"? 
A. Yes, it was. 
0. What was the response thai you goi at that tune? 
A. Well, it wab kind of a had response. 
Q, The same response that Officer Watts testified to? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Okay. 
Mr. Richards: I object to this. Kow did the witness know 
this unless he was oui talking to Officer Watfs? 
The court: The objection is correct. 
?vlr. Daines: I tnink it is too, Your Honor. 
At this point, Defendant's counsel, Mr. Richards requested 
that that witness be excused and his testimony stricken. The 
Court, however, allowed the continuation of his testimony. 
/T-> O I A Q 1 1 \ 
\i\.«)iu, o i i ; 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the jury retired, 
deliberated for approximately one hour arid returned with a 
verdict of guilty to both connts. (R.713-715} The Defendant 
waived his time for sentencing and was sentenced co a term in the 
Utah State Prison of not less than five years but maybe for life-
plus on^ year for the use of a firearm. (R.69) 
The Defendant personally filed a Notice of Appeal on \Tay 1, 
1985, appealing this conviction. 
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trial and this request was not complied with by the prosecution. 
Finally, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the intent necessary to convict the Defendant of attempted 
murder. 
ARCgJMENT 
POINT I 
VIOLATION OF TOE COURT'S ORDER EXCLUDING 
WITNESSES CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom during a trial 
is addressed in Section 78-7-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as 
amended), which provides, in relevant part, "And in any cause, 
the Court .may, in it's discretion during the examination of a 
witness exclude any and all other witnesses in the cause." 
The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom in a criminal 
trial, pursuant to this Section, has been addressed in several 
recent Supreme Court decisions. In State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 
(Utah 1981), the Court was presented with a case in which the 
Defendant was on trial for a charge of possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute. The defense counsel 
moved for, and the Court granted, a ivtotion excluding witnesses 
from the courtroom. During the course of the trial, several of 
the State's witnesses were overheard talking together with the 
Prosecutor concerning various aspects of the case. Later in the 
case, some of these tainted witnesses were called to testify 
further and the defense attorney lodged an objection. The Court 
overruled the objection and permitted the testimony of these 
witnesses to be presented to the jury. Tne Supreme Court 
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most closely applicable as far as the factual situation in 
relationship to the Dfendant's case and should therefore be 
controlling in this instance* In the Ti lman case, the Court 
held, "Under all the circumstances evidenced by the record, 
particularly in light of the sharp dispute of the issue of 
identification, and the absence of any remedial procedures taken 
by the Court to mitigate the prejudicial effect of the violation, 
the Court is of the opinion that a new trial must be granted,* 
In the present case, there is evidence in the transcript of 
several of the officers talking outside the courtroom during the 
period of time the order excluding witnesses was in effect. The 
Judge, upon registering defense attorneyfs objection, stated that 
the objection was correct and in fact, the Prosecutor concurred 
stating, "I think it is too, Your Honor"* Defense counsel moved 
that the witness be excused and his testimony stricken. The 
trial court, for some reason, did not go any further into the 
violation and did not make an assessment as to whether the 
Defendant had been prejudiced by such a violation. A thorough 
reading of the record will show that the Defendant was extremely 
prejudiced by the remark of the officer, which was obtained 
through the violation of this exclusion rule. The defense, in 
their case was based upon thue theory that due to the combination 
of drugs, alcohol and a gun shot wound, the Defendant did not 
recognize any of the individuals at which he shot to be officers 
of the law. The statement alluded to by the witness in violation 
of the exclusion rule, concerned calling the officer a name which 
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In the case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 33, 10 LEd.2d 215, 83 
S.Ct. 1194, (19G3), the Supreme Court stated, "We now hold that 
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request, violates due process where the evidence is 
mater i a 1 either to the guilt or punishment irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution". (j_d at 87, emphasis 
added.) 
The standard, therefore, applied in determining whether or 
not the suppression of evidence would warrant a reversal is 
whether that evidence is material, and whether that evidence, if 
introduced at trial, would probably produce an acquittal upon 
retrial. In the present case, this standard is clearly met. 
The Supreme Court in Brady noted that a pre-requi s i te to 
discovery was a request by the Defendant of the articles wished 
to be discovered. Brady makes no differentiation as to whether 
that request must be prior to trial in a formal discovery motion, 
or whether a request during the course of the trial would be 
sufficient to invoke the discovery requirements under that 
decision. It is clear that the due process clause of the 
Constitution would require that the State produce evidence at any 
time upon a proper request by Defendant's counsel. This is 
particularly true in a criminal case where the normal civil type 
discovery tools (i.e. Interrogatories, Requests for Admission and 
Depositions) are not available to the Defendant. It is 
consequently a common occurrence in a criminal trial to be 
surprised to some extent by evidence that is discovered during 
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would facilatate a determination as to when the Defendant 
received the bullet to his head, would be crucial to the defense 
and obviously material to the guilt of the Defendant in this 
case. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 10, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH WERE 
VIOLATED BY THE FAILURE TO ALLCW HIM TO CONFRONT 
AND CROSS-EXAMINE CONFIDENTIAL IM^ORMANTS 
During the State's case in chief, Officer Randy Watts was 
called to the stand to testify. Officer Watts testified that an 
unnamed confidential informant told him that the Defendant was 
staying in the mobile home, that he was armed and that he would 
not be taken alive. Officer Watts relied upon this information 
and surrounded the house where the Defendant was eventually 
found. Counsel for Defendant objected numerous times to the 
entry of this information into evidence on two grounds. First, 
that it was a violation of a hearsay rule, and second, that it 
was in violation of the Defendant's constitutional right to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him. The Court overruled 
defense objections and allowed the testimony into evidence. 
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in 
McCray v. Illinois, 336 U.S. 300, 18 LEd.2d 62, 37 S.Ct 1056, 
(1967). In that case, the Court was presented with a situation 
in which a confidential informant told the police officers that 
an individual had drugs on his person. The officers stopped the 
individual, searched him and found some drugs. The Defendant 
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notably different than the situations which precipitated the 
decisions in McCray and Cooper. In this case, Officer Watts 
testified to information not only as to the whereabouts of the 
Defendant, which Defendant would concede would not be a violation 
of his rights, but went further in stating that the Defendant was 
armed and would not be taken alive. This single statement 
strikes at the very heart of D e f e n d a n t s claim that he was acting 
in self defense when he fired the shots at individuals he did not 
know to be police officers. 
Furthermore, this is clearly a violation of the hearsay 
rule, in that it goes further than being used "not for the truth 
of the matter". If the" State had stopped Officer Watts at the 
point in his testimony where he saiu that the Defendant was In 
the house, it would be correct that the hearsay rule was not 
violated and that the Defendant's right to confront witnesses was 
not violated. But where the State went further, and the Court 
permitted this testimony over the objections of defense counsel 
to i n c l u d e the entry into evidence of the statements that 
Defendant was armed and that he would not be taken alive, is a 
clear v i o l a t i o n of both the h e a r s a y rule and Defendant's 
constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. 
The Defendant in this point, is arguing consistently with 
McCray and Cooper, in that the Defendant is not asking that all 
the statements be suppressed or that the entire case be thrown 
out on the basis that the Prosecutor would not produce the 
i d e n t i t y of the confidential Informant, The Defendant is 
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determination of whether the Defendant possessed this requisite 
criminal knowledge or intent is a determination that is to be 
made by the jury. Furthermore, under Utah law, a person must be 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the 
offense which would, in this case, include the element of 
knowlege or intent. Section 76-1-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
(as amended). 
The Supreme Court is generally hesitant to reverse a lower 
court's conviction of an individual on the basis of insufficient 
evidence. This reluctancy is expressed in State v. Newbold, 58J 
P. 2d SSI (Utah 1S72), where the Court held, "To set aside a jury 
verdict, evidence must appear so inconclusive and unsatisfactory 
that reasonable minds acting fairly upon it must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime." 
In the present case, the evidence is so inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory as to intent, that a reasonable mind must have 
found a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime. 
The insufficiency of evidence in this case is evident, 
particularly so when the items improperly introduced into 
evidence as alluded in the prior and following points are 
suppressed as they properly should be. In this case, it was 
required of the State to prove that the Defendant knowingly or 
intentionally attempted to cause a death of another. The 
evidence produced at trial, particularly concerning the drugged 
and intoxicated state of the Defendant, and the evidence that the 
Defendant did not shoot until after he had been hit, indicate 
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that the knowledge or intention required for conviction under the 
present charge was not present. Furthermore, the plain clothing 
of the officer and the fear which the Defendant expressed that he 
may be a victim of crime, in this particular instance, would tend 
to support the conclusion that he did not possess the requisite 
intent as charged under this statute. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED TESTIMQNY 
CONCERNING APPELLANTS PRIOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
INTO EVIDENCE 
The Appellant was brought to trial on these charges in July 
of 1981 and, at that time, the Court was governed by the former 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states in relevant 
part that "Evidence of specific instances of conduct other than 
evidence of conviction of a crime which tends to prove the trait 
to be bad shall be i nadmi s sab 1 eff unless ffthe accused has 
introduced evidence of his good character". 
Rule 55 goes further to state: 
"Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person 
committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion is inadmissable to prove 
his disposition to commit crime or civil 
wrong as the basis for the inference that 
he committed another crime or civil wrong 
on another specified occasion. But subject 
to Rules 45 and 48 such evidence is 
admissable when relevant to prove some 
other material fact, including absence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 
ident i ty"• 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed this issue in the case 
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of State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978). In that case, the 
Court held, 
"This Court has stated on numerous occasions 
that evidence of other crimes allegedly 
committed by the Defendant is not admissable 
if the purpose is to disgrace the Defendant 
as a person of evil character with a 
propensity...,.to commit crime and thus likely 
to have committed the crime charged. However, 
if the evidence has relevency to explain 
circumstances surrounding the instant crime, 
it is admissable for that purpose and the 
fact that it may tend to connect a Defendant 
with another crime will not render it incompetent". 
(Id at 882) 
In the Dan i el s case, the Court affirmed the lower court's 
ruling admitting evidence of prior bad conduct on the basis that 
it was relevant to explain the circumstances surrounding the 
instant crime a..d it was committed in conjunction with or during 
the course of the crime charged. 
See also State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977), where 
although the Court held, "Nevertheless if the evidence has 
relevance and probative value relating to his commission of the 
crime charged, the fact that it shows commission of another crime 
does not render it incompetent", (I^ d at 786) the other crime 
was one committed during the same criminal episode. 
In the present case, during the State's case in chief, 
evidence was presented through several of the State's witnesses 
concerning outstanding felony v/arrants against the Defendant, and 
evidence concerning the fact that the Defendant had recently 
escaped from the Utah State Prison. The Court overruled defense 
counsel's objections and ruled that this evidence was admissable 
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as part of the res gestae. 
It is clear that the situation in the present case is vastly 
different from the facts which precipitated the Courts1 decisions 
in Daniels and Gibson. In the present case, the State introduced 
evidence of prior convictions that had nothing to do with the 
current offense. Defense counsel strenuously objected to the 
introduction of this evidence and in fact, offered a compromise 
by saying that it would be sufficient for the State to merely 
state that the Defendant was wanted on a warrant. 
The Court, in allowing the testimony concerning Defendant's 
prior criminal record, ruled in direct violation of former Rule 
47 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Furthermore, this violation 
was not one of harmless error, in that it went directly toward 
the Defendant's character. This type of evidence weighs strongly 
in the minds of the jury, particularly, when the Defendant would 
not have taken the stand, had the admission of this evidence not 
been allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above and foregoing argument, the Defendant 
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the conviction in this 
case and remand for a new trial which is consistent with the 
Court f s rulings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi 
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